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This paper illustrates the major issues influencing interaction between environmental regulation and
international trade by reviewing the empirical studies and theoretical results of the last 20 years.  The
second section of the paper discusses how environmental regulation distorts comparative advantage
and specialization.  The third part covers the impact of environmental regulation on the location of
polluting industries.  The fourth part covers transnational pollution and trade in wastes.  The fifth
section discusses major conflicts between trade policy and environmental policy.  The final part
addresses strategic environmental policy and international trade.
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1I.  Introduction
Governments have used trade policies to enforce multinational environmental treaties.  Two such treaties are
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) and the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1991).  Similarly, individual
nations have tried to enforce their environmental standards using trade sanctions such as the U.S. embargo on
tuna products from Mexico.  Recently, conventional economists have challenged such practices saying that
they impede free trade and violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  These economists
argue that trade measures are inefficient polices for preserving the environment.  Some free trade proponents
criticize domestic environmental standards as non-tariff barriers and label the environment as the last refuge of
protectionism.
Some firms and industries consider stringent environmental regulations a threat to their international
competitiveness because the environmental regulations cause a significant increase in production costs.  A
common theory is that polluting industries located in the countries with tight environmental regulations are
economically disadvantaged compared to industries in countries with lenient environmental regulations.
On the contrary, environmental groups often raise concerns over the possible adverse environmental impact of
trade liberalization.  They fear that a more integrated world economy (as represented by the European Union,
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or the World Trade Organization) will hasten the
exhaustion of natural resources, increase pollution around the world, and encourage ecological dumping in
developing countries.  Some cite the experience of the Maquiladora Sector, an export-oriented manufacturing
zone of Mexico, as proof of the danger of free trade to environmental protection.  Environmentalists argue that
without traditional trade policies, fierce international competition may force governments to relax strict
environmental regulations.  This will lead to lowered environmental standards that are common across nations.
2 In the case of transboundary pollution, the free movement of capital will not only damage the economy, but
also undermine the environment of the countries from which capital flows.  Environmentalists favor trade
measures for enforcing environmental regulations.  They actively lobby legislatures to incorporate
environmental policies into trade agreements.  In the future, conflict between trade policy and environmental
policy will intensify.
The trade and the environment dilemma is another collision between economic growth and environmental
preservation in an open economy.  Because resources are scarce, it is hard for economists to find ways to
promote trade while adequately protecting the environment.
This paper illustrates the major issues influencing interaction between environmental regulation and
international trade by reviewing the empirical studies and theoretical results of the last 20 years.  The second
section of the paper discusses how environmental regulation distorts comparative advantage and specialization.
 The third part covers the impact of environmental regulation on the location of polluting industries.  The
fourth part covers transnational pollution and trade in wastes.  The fifth section discusses major conflicts
between trade policy and environmental policy.  The final part addresses strategic environmental policy and
international trade.
II. Distortion of Comparative Advantage and Specialization
As early as 1972, the United States Congress expressed its concern over the potential impact of domestic and
foreign environmental programs on the comparative advantage of U.S. manufacturing industries.  Section 6 of
the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act requires the United States Commerce
Department to investigate the issue.  During the 1970s, 10 empirical studies examined the effects of
environmental regulation on international trade (Ugelow 1982).  The most recent economic recession and a
3persistent trade deficit led some policymakers and industry lobbyists to argue that stringent environmental
policy has hurt the competitiveness of U.S. industries.  They argue that costly environmental regulations cause
American manufacturers to face unfair competition in the world market.  A coalition of business people and
conservative economists suggests that the United States relax or abolish environmental regulation.  Anxiety
over the negative effects of environmental policy on the comparative advantage is more intense than ever.
According to the international trade theory, technology and factor endowment (endowment of basic inputs to
production) are the sources for comparative advantage.  Differential availability of technology can give a
comparative advantage to a country and persuade that country to specialize in a given industry because the
costs of the associated technology are low.  Economists call this viewpoint Ricardo's theorem.  We can contrast
it with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, which states that when technology is constant across countries,
comparative advantage and the pattern of trade will depend on factor endowment.  A country will have a
production advantage if it has abundant resources.  Obviously, strict environmental regulations imply higher
pollution disposal costs and lower natural capacity to assimilate pollution. 
In 1991 the total pollution abatement capital expenditure (PACE) of all U.S. industries was $101.7 billions,
7.5% of their total capital expenditure.  For some polluting industries, the share of abatement expenditures  in
total capital expenditure is much higher. In particular, the PACE of the U.S. chemical industry in 1991 was
$2.1 billion, 12.9% of the total industry capital expenditure.  For the U.S petroleum industry, the PACE was
$1.5 billion, or 24.8% of its total capital expenditure, in 1991 (Jaffe et al, 1995).
Intuitively, if strict environmental regulation increases costs, any comparative advantage from a less costly
technology will lessen.  In the classic Ricardian model with a continuum of commodities (Dornbusch, Fisher,
and Samuelson 1977), a tiny cost increase in a country will cause that country to lose an industry.  Readers can
4find rigorous theoretical statements about the impact of environmental regulation on comparative advantage in
Siebert (1974, 1977), Pethig (1976), McGuire (1982), Baumol and Oates (1989), Carraro and Siniscalco
(1992), and Krutilla (1991).
According to classic Ricardian theory, trade patterns and comparative advantages between two countries are
determined by the relative prices of the commodities traded between the countries.  It also says price
differences are due to technology differences.  If a country imposes environmental regulations that require
regulated industries to pay environmental costs, then the price ratio of the commodities produced by pollution
intensive industries may change.
Siebert (1977) constructs a two-commodity open economy model with one nontraded resource as input.  In the
model, pollution is a byproduct of production.  Siebert conducts comparative static analysis on relative
commodity prices as a function of pollutant emissions.  He suggests that the Environmental Protection Agency
should collect effluent charges and enforce external environmental regulation.  Industries absorb the
environmental costs by paying effluent charges.  The constraints of environmental standards determine the best
way to use resources.  Siebert concludes that relative commodity prices depend not only on an industry's
marginal productivity but also on its tendency to pollute, the social damage it sustains, and unit effluent fees. 
All these factors determine comparative advantage in terms of environmental abundance or scarcity.  Holding
other variables constant, the price ratio of more polluting products to less polluting products is an increasing
function of the shadow price of the assimilative capacity if the first good is produced less efficiently than the
latter.  Because an abundant assimilative capacity implies a lower shadow price, the country that has more of a
particular environmental resource has a comparative advantage.  It can produce more pollution-intensive
products and will export pollution-intensive commodities. 
5Baumol and Oates (1989) presented similar conclusions.  In their model, two countries produce an identical
traded commodity.  The production processes in both countries generate pollution.  Under partial equilibrium
conditions, Baumol and Oates argue that if a country does not develop an environmental protection program
when other countries do, that country will increase its comparative advantage or decrease its comparative
disadvantage in the pollution-intensive industry.  It will then specialize in that industry at the cost of
environmental damage.
Instead of emission fees, some environmental regulations require a technology standard.  Carraro and
Siniscalco (1992) analyze how the new technologies required by some environmental policies affect the
competitiveness of pollution-intensive industries.  They consider a polluting industry in an open economy
where domestic firms produce only one commodity and compete in the international market.  Capital goods
and technology are not traded.  The authors assume that before the home country imposes mandatory
technology standards for reducing emissions, the industry freely trades the product in the world market and all
countries have identical technology.  Technological innovation increases the marginal cost of the product. 
Under different market structures--perfect competition, Bertrand oligopoly, Cournot oligopoly -- they examine
how the industry's profit changes after the home country imposes unilateral pollution control.  Carraro and
Siniscalco conclude that in the presence of international competition, the technical changes required by
environmental laws will distort the industry's competitiveness causing it to lose profits.  They suggest a
government subsidy is the best way to compensate for the loss of competitiveness.  The optimal subsidy
depends on the market structure and abatement costs.
These theoretical arguments only focus on the efficiency losses from trade.  They ignore the improvement in
environmental quality.  In other words, there is no overall measure of gains from trade and improvement in
6environmental quality.  Siebert (1977) discusses the interaction between trade gains and environmental
regulation.  He studies a small country with two production sectors  engaged in international trade.  Initially,
this country has a comparative advantage in producing a pollution-intensive product.  Siebert finds that if the
country exports pollution-intensive commodities but does not enact environmental regulations, its trade gains
are partly offset by environment degradation.  Also, the welfare loss from environmental damage may
outweigh the gains from trade, under certain conditions.  If the government imposes environmental regulation,
environmental quality will improve, but trade will suffer.  On the other hand, with the introduction of
environmental policy, industry reallocates resources.  Resources for polluting industries will decline and
exports will fall.  In addition, the environmental policy will cause an overall gain in welfare if the marginal
social costs of producing the commodity are higher than the marginal value of consuming the commodity.
As illustrated above, in a two-country open economy, difference in the strictness of environmental regulation
may affect the trade pattern and competitiveness of regulated firms.  What are the trade effects if the two
countries have the same level of strictness but use different environmental policy instruments?   Sartzetakis and
Constantatos (1994) analyze the case with an international oligopolistic model.  In the model, the authors
assume that the two countries--the south country and north country have the same emission ceiling but impose
different policy instruments to reach their objective.  In the south country, the government adopts a tradeable
emission permits system.  The north country government employs a command and control approach which
requires its firms to reduce their emission by a given level.  Their polluting firms conduct Cournot competition
in the international market.  The authors show that at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the firms regulated by the
tradable emission permit have a larger market share than the firms regulated by the command and control
method.  The advantage of the market-based instrument becomes greater as the diversity of the abatement
technology within the country increases.  This is because the market-based instrument system reduces the
average pollution abatement costs through permit trading.
7In addition to regulatory instruments, policymakers use well-defined property rights as an alternative policy to
prevent environmental deterioration.  Chichilnisky (1994) uses a north-south trade model to illustrate the
interaction between international trade and property rights.  The north-south trade model is similar to the
classic Heckscher-Ohlin model except that the availability of environmental resources, or production inputs,
are price-dependent.  In the model, the two regions have identical technologies, resources, and preferences. 
They only differ in the property rights laws that apply to environmental resources.  Environmental resources
are unregulated common property in the south but private property in the north.  Chichilnisky shows that under
common property rights more resources are supplied at any given price.  This conveys "apparent comparative
advantage" to the south though it has no advantage over the north.  Chichilnisky argues that free trade between
the two regions increases overuse of environmental resources, resulting from ill-defined property rights in the
south.  Free trade also transmits the resource misallocation to the north as the  prices of the traded goods and
factors equalize.  More importantly, Chichilnisky shows that under the common property program, tax on the
use of environmental resources may increase their use.  She suggests that property rights may be more effective
in preventing over-extraction of environmental resources in an open economy.
The debate on the impact of environmental regulation on comparative advantage has generated many empirical
studies.  Because there is no widely accepted indicator to measure this impact, the empirical studies have used
different approaches.  Most analyses are on the micro-level focusing on individual industries.  The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) case studies of Italy, the Netherlands,
Japan, and the United States are macro-level evaluations of environmental policy (OECD, 1978).  Ugelow
(1982) reviews 10 empirical studies through the 1970s on the costs of environmental regulation and its effect
on international trade.  Ugelow reports that there is no consistent conclusion on the issues.  Findings from the
U.S. Commerce Department (1975) based on the performance of four individual industries indicate that
8environmental programs have only a slight impact on short term trade patterns and the comparative advantage
of the United States.  Studies by Walter (1982) and Robinson (1988), however, suggest that the impact can be
substantial.  Also, they find their influence on a country's balance of trade insignificant.  Walter and Robinson's
conclusions are supported by the OECD's macro-evaluation.  Even though it is difficult to compare these
diverse studies, it seems that the impact of environmental regulations on international trade is less than
expected.
To explore the empirical evidence regarding the impact of environmental regulations on U.S. international
trade, Pasurka (1985) examines the change in the United States' "effective protection rate" due to
environmental control costs.  The effective protection rate is a partial equilibrium measure of the protection
that an industry receives from the country's tariff structure.  Calculating the value-added for an industry with
and without tariff protection, the effective protection rate is the difference in the value added of output in the
industry in the two cases, normalized by the value-added in the industry with no tariff protection.  Pasurka
finds that only direct environmental costs influence the effective protection rate.  He also finds that
environmental control costs reduce the effective protection rate by only 20%.  Using 1971 data, Walter (1982)
finds that the loss is 27% of the protection rate.
Robinson (1988) uses two measures to examine the impact of environmental regulation on international trade. 
First, he uses time series data on the ratio of imported and exported abatement cost content per dollar of
product value to identify changes in trade patterns and comparative advantage.  The abatement content per
dollar of sales is the share of pollution abatement and control costs per dollar of product value (Walter, 1982). 
The statistical results show that the ratio rose from 1.17 to 1.39% between 1973 and 1982.  This suggests that
the pollution control content of goods imported to the United States increased at a higher rate than did the
control content of exported goods.  In other words, imports have higher abatement cost content than do
9exports.  Robinson asserts that environmental regulation reduced the United States' manufacturing comparative
advantage in pollution-intensive industries and caused a shift in trade patterns towards importing pollution-
intensive commodities.
In the second approach, Robinson applies a partial equilibrium method to find the marginal effect of abatement
costs on the trade balance for individual polluting industries.  Instead of considering aggregate trade, he
develops a country trade balance equation with 78 agricultural and manufacturing sectors.  Assuming that the
full costs of environmental regulation are incorporated into the price of the final products, he concludes that the
marginal effect of abatement costs on international trade depends on price elasticities of export and import
quantities and on relative prices. 
For those sectors Robinson considered, the marginal effect of stricter environmental regulation on exports is
negative except for the mining industry.  Robinson calculates that if the abatement costs drive up price by 1%,
the trade balance of the selected agricultural products will decline $245 million.  Of that amount $95.8 million
is caused by reduced agricultural exports and increased agricultural imports.  Robinson attributes the reminder
to the indirect effect of agricultural prices on other sectors.  In addition, if the marginal effect of abatement cost
on the balance of individual industries is measured by the percentage of total trade value of the industry, the
impact ranges from -0.12 (special industrial machinery) to -7.08 (copper). 
Robinson's statistical results imply that environmental policy has a significant influence on the balance of trade
if environmental costs are fully reflected in commodity prices.  However, Robinson's model is unclear about
how pollution abatement and control costs could drive up prices by 1%.  In addition, if monopoly power exists
in the market, the assertion that pollution abatement and control costs would translate into price on a one-to-
one basis is questionable.
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One of the most recent empirical studies on trade and the environment is by Toby (1990).  His method is
completely different from the others.  He uses a Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model of international trade to
test the hypothesis that the strictness of environmental regulations is linearly related to the exports of polluting
industries.  In his study, Toby defines a dirty industry as one in which total pollution abatement and control
costs are equal to or higher than 1.85% of production costs.  By this standard, Toby selects all the dirty
industries from 64 standard agricultural and manufacturing sectors, including paper and pulp products, ore
mining, primary iron and steel, primary nonferrous metals, and chemicals.  He develops two different
approaches from the extended HOV model.
First, Toby introduces into the model a numerical scale to indicate the strictness of environmental regulation. 
The scale ranges from one to seven, with seven standing for the strictest regulation.  Toby regresses the exports
of dirty industries on eleven factor endowments and the strictness indicator with cross-section data from 23
countries.  The statistical results do not support the hypothesis of a significant linear relationship between the
stringency of environmental regulations and the exports of the dirty industries. 
The second approach is an omitted variable test.  If environmental regulation is one of the explanatory
variables determining exports from polluting industries, and if it has a negative impact, then the model will be
incorrect when the environmental variable is omitted.  An incorrect model must be biased.  The residual of the
model should be negative for developed countries but positive for developing countries if the impact of the
environmental program is negative.  At least, the proportion of negative residuals in the former should be
higher than in the latter.  By examining the residuals, with no assumed distribution of the residual, Toby
concludes that the impact of domestic environmental regulations on the export of polluting industries is not
significant.
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There appears to be some inconsistencies between the theoretical findings and the results of empirical studies. 
All theoretical arguments suggest that environmental regulations could create distortions in comparative
advantage and specialization in dirty industries.  However, some empirical studies, such as those by Toby
(1990), OECD (1978) and the U.S Department of Commerce (1975), do not support the theoretical assessment
that environmental regulations affect trade.  For the empirical studies that reveal substantial evidence in favor
of the theoretical arguments, the results are less than expected. This leaves room for further research.
III.  Relocation of "Dirty Industry"
Besides the static effect of environmental regulation on comparative advantage, environmental regulations may
have a dynamic influence on capital flows in an open economy, particularly on the relocation of pollution-
intensive industries.  Some observers argue that strict environmental policies in one country may cause dirty
industries to migrate to countries with more lenient environmental regulations.  This claim is referred to as the
Industry Flight Hypothesis.  The prediction is based on three arguments. 
First, all environmental regulations, no matter how efficient, will drive up the production costs in pollution-
intensive industries, either directly or indirectly.  Second, stringent environmental regulations make it difficult
for polluting industries to find  proper sites for new investment.  Finally, some regulations have a direct effect
on the range of products or the inputs of production, which may cause producers to seek sites outside their
original area.  A dual theory about the impact of environmental policy on capital movement is the Pollution
Haven Hypothesis.  It states that developing countries may set lenient or moderate environmental regulations as
a strategy to lure industrial investment.
Extensive industrial migration to foreign countries can cause unemployment, undermine the balance of trade,
and threaten national security.  Thus, industry flight is not only an economic issue, but also a political one. 
Moreover, free trade agreements, which may improve the mobility of capital, are thought to speed the trend. 
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Some environmental groups and labor unions, for example, have used these hypotheses to argue against the
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  They predicated that once NAFTA is in effect, dirty
industries will head to Mexico to exploit that pollution haven.
McGuire (1982) presents a theoretical analysis of the movement of capital across boundaries resulting from
environmental regulation.  Based on a Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model with two factors and two countries,
McGuire introduces an environmental factor as a new input of labor-intensive industry x, assumed to be a
pollution-generating industry.  He measures the environmental regulation by the Marginal Productivity of
Environment Factor (MPEF).  MPEF is a variable determined by the public.  If MPEF is equal to zero, it
indicates there are no pollution regulations.  McGuire infers that environmental regulation's impact on industry
x is equivalent to negative neutral technical progress.  In other words, for the same bundle of labor and capital
inputs, output is lower when the industry must comply with environmental regulation.  Therefore, if the price
ratio of the commodities is constant, the resource will be reallocated between two industries so that the rent to
capital will rise and be higher than in the foreign country.  And, the real wage rate at the home country will be
lower than in the foreign country.  Thus, under free mobility of capital and labor as well as constant relative
prices, labor will move out of the home country and capital will flow in. 
According to the Rybczynski theorem (Rybczynski, 1995), the regulated industry will diminish until
production of x reaches zero.  Therefore, in an open economy, the polluting industry of the home country will
move to the foreign country with lenient environmental regulation.  Rauscher (1993) reached a similar
conclusion.
Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1993) developed a two-country and two-firm model to illustrate the impact of
environmental regulation on polluting firms' decisions about where to locate.  In their model, the firms are able
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to enter or exit a country and to change the number and locations of their factories in response to the
environmental policies of the countries. Under the assumed environmental policies--emission taxes--their best
decision is a two-stage solution. 
In the first stage, the two firms choose the number and locations of their factories.  In stage two, the firms play
Cournot game to determine their output in the market.  Markusen, Morey and Olewiler conclude that if a
nation imposes unilateral pollution tax, the number of factories will decrease and firms will leave when the tax
exceeds a certain point.  In addition, because the number and locations of the factories are the internal variables
in the model, the best environmental policy will differ significantly from those suggested by the convention
Pigouvian marginal analysis in which market structure is influenced by outside factors.  Markusen, Morey and
Olewiler emphasize that, if a nation ignores the internal influence in determining an "optimal" emission tax the
welfare losses caused by its unilateral emission tax is greater than expected.
The industry flight hypothesis has generated several empirical studies.  Among them are Walter (1982),
Leonard and Duerksen (1980), Pearson (1987), Leonard (1988), Lucas, Wheeler and Hettige (1992) as well as
Low and Yeates (1992).  Walter (1982) investigates two levels.  For evidence at the level of polluting
industries to support this hypothesis, Walter surveys three categories of data:
(1) the closing rate of factories when it is related to environmental regulations,
(2) the cost to multinational corporations to comply with environmental regulations, both domestically and
abroad, and
(3) foreign investment in polluting industries. 
None of these measures suggest a significant relationship between the location of pollution-intensive industries
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and environmental regulation.  At the corporate level, interviews with executives do not support the hypothesis
that environment regulation is a key factor in their decisions about factory locations.
Low and Yeates (1992) discuss the redistribution of polluting industries worldwide with two indicators.  Those
are the share of polluting industry's export in total world export and the Revealed Comparative Advantage
(RCA) of an industry.  A country's RCA is defined as the ratio of that industry's share in the country's export to
the industry's share in the total manufacturing export.  If a country's RCA for an industry is greater than 1, the
country has an advantage in the industry.  Defining a set of polluting industries, Low and Yeates find these
industries' share of export declined from 18.9% to 15.7% between 1965 and 1988.  For all industrialized
countries, the share of these industries relative to all exports also decreased, from 20.4% in 1966 to 15.9% in
1988. 
Obviously, polluting industries have lessened around the world.  The RCA indices representing the iron and
steel pipes and tubes industry for 109 countries are calculated for two different periods: 1966 to 1968 and 1986
to 1988.  From 1966 to 1968, only 11% of the sampled countries had RCA greater than 1.  Although the
percentage rose to 22% from 1986 to 1988, most of this increase occurred in developing countries.  Among the
developing countries, the countries with RCA greater than 1 doubled from 6 to 12 between 1986 and 1988. 
Against a background of polluting industries' declining share, especially in industrialized countries, Low and
Yeates conclude that it is likely the environmental regulation of industrialized countries caused polluting
industries to move from developed to developing countries.
Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige's (1992) empirical studies test three hypotheses that describe the relationship
between economic growth and air pollution.  One hypothesis is that the OECD's environmental policies drive
dirty industries to developing countries.  The authors test this hypothesis using two regression models.  First,
they follow backward the toxin emission density on the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the time
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trend.  Second, they do the same with the growth rate of toxin density on the growth rate of GDP per capital
and economic structure, which is represented by the Dollar Index.1  Results for both estimates suggest that the
poorest countries have the highest growth rate of polluting industries.  However, these estimates are
insufficient to infer a causal relationship between environmental regulation and displacement of polluting
industries.  They reveal, however, that economic growth has a significantly smaller effect on pollution in open
economies than closed economies.  Even though the authors do not connect their findings with the industry
flight hypothesis, their empirical results contradict it.  If polluting industries are migrating enmass to
developing countries, then developing countries with open economies should experience a rapid increase of
polluting industries.  This is not happening.
Leonard and Duerksen (1980) analyze the investment and trade data to track the relationship between
environmental regulation and the migration of pollution-intensive industries.  Their statistical results reveal that
the growth of U.S. investment in developing countries did not exceed the entire overseas investment growth
rate.  In fact, the gap between U.S. investment in developing countries versus developed countries widened for
some polluting industries, such as chemical industries.  Their analysis of relevant trade data for the United
States and the United Kingdom (1971 to 1976) suggests that imports of pollution-intensive products have not
grown faster than other categories of imports.  Although they would have if polluting industries were fleeing
these industrialized countries while demand for the pollution-intensive products remained the same.  The share
of imported pollution-intensive products from developing countries increased slightly, but the total numbers do
not indicate a significant shift of import orientation to pollution-intensive products.
To examine whether NAFTA would strengthen the incentive for the U.S industries to establish a "pollution 
haven" in Mexico, Grossman and Krueger (1992) econometrically evaluate the explanatory power of the
                                                          
1The Dollar index is the ratio of domestic prices to world prices and is a measure of the openness
of an economy.
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pollution abatement costs of the U.S. industries compared to the pattern of the U.S-Mexico trade.  They
consider three different trade patterns:
(1) the pattern of total U.S imports from Mexico,
(2) the pattern of U.S imports from Mexico that have entered the country under the offshore assembly
provisions, and
(3) the sectoral pattern of value added by maquiladora plants (see page 2). 
Besides the pollution abatement costs, Grossman and Krueger include factor shares and the U.S effective tariff
rate as additional explanatory variables for trade patterns.  The statistical results indicate that the pollution
abatement cost is not a significant explanatory variable.  This implies that Mexico's lenient environmental
policy has no significant role in motivating trade and investment flows between the two countries. 
Additionally, the authors use a computable general equilibrium model to predict the change of the industrial
structure under NAFTA in U.S., Canada and Mexico.  Contrary to the environmentalists' claim that Mexico 
would specialize in pollution-intensive industries with trade liberalization, the model indicates that Mexico's
labor intensive industries, which are relative clean, would significantly expand.  On the other hand, both the
US and Canada show substantial increases in polluting industries such as chemicals and metals.
The studies mentioned previously cover the international marketplace.  Alternatively, McConnell and Schwab
(1990), and Bartik (1988) conduct some empirical studies focusing on the variation of the U.S. domestic
environmental regulations among the states.  During 1970s, water and air regulations differed among the states.
 Bartik uses a location decision model (McFadden condition logit model) to examine how this disparity
affected the locations of new factories opened by the fortune 500 companies from 1972 to 1978.  He applied
the state spending on pollution control, pollution compliance costs of regulated industries, and the permitted
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pounds of particulates as quantitative proxies of the air and water regulation of each individual state.  Bartik's
statistical results show that none of the environmental regulations significantly influenced location decisions.
McConnell and Schwab (1990) used the identical location model to test the relationship between the location
of the vehicle industry and a states environmental regulations. Their tests did not concur with the industry
flight hypothesis.
In fact, the reasons determining the location of an industry are many, including the ability to have access to
resources, accessibility to markets, transportation costs, political stability, and labor supply.  The decision on
where to invest is complicated, and most of the factors have little to do with the environment.  Undoubtedly,
more and more investors will consider the environmental factor.  But perhaps that is not happening yet, which
is why authors have been unable to find significant evidence to confirm the industry flight hypothesis. 
Leonard (1988) believes the conclusion of relocation based on comparative advantage is too static and narrow.
 He argues for a more comprehensive analysis that considers product cycle, industry location theories,
bargaining processes, and political issues. 
Pearson (1987) identifies three pitfalls in the empirical studies on the pollution haven and industry flight
hypotheses:
(1) there is no clear definition of environmental costs,
(2) the data are incomplete, and
(3) the authorities of pollution havens will not admit that the real motivation of foreign investment is to
escape strict environmental regulation. 
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None of the empirical studies found convincing evidence that pollution-intensive industries have relocated
their facilities to developing countries because of strict domestic environment policy.  However, we cannot
ignore that the percentage of capital expenditure on pollution abatement and control for Multinational
Enterprises (MNE) is generally higher in home countries than in overseas subsidiaries (Ugelow, 1982). 
In Walters' (1982) investigation of domestic and overseas pollution costs for five major U.S industries between
1970 and 1980, almost all their overseas subsidiaries had lower pollution abatement and control costs than did
their subsidiaries in the United States.  Because an MNE has more experience in overseas investment and can
easily transfer production facilities to developing countries, we cannot exclude the possibility that the MNE
will move its facilities to a developing country if all factors influencing the location decision are the same
except environmental regulations.
IV.  Transnational Pollution and Trade
Transnational pollution is a complicated problem.  To understand its relationship with international trade, we
must resolve two questions.  First, is trade policy a useful instrument for reducing transnational pollution?  And
second, does free trade increase transnational pollution?  Before we examine these questions closely, it is
necessary to clarify some related concepts. 
Usually transnational pollution is classified into two types that differ according to the pollutant's 
characteristics and the way in which the pollution is transmitted from one country to another.  The first type of
transnational pollution is a pure externality.  The pollutant is transmitted via air, rivers, lakes, and precipitation.
 Examples are acid rain and carbon dioxide emissions.  Generally, the externality is undepletable. 
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The second type of transnational pollution is the trade in wastes, including hazardous and nonhazardous solid
wastes.  The wastes are shipped from the generating country to another country which disposes of the wastes. 
In this case, pollution is no longer an externality because the process is governed by bilateral agreement.  The
exporting country must be able to free itself from the wastes or the waste disposal process.  This requires that
all the wastes involved in the transaction be depletable.
A.  Transnational Pollution as an Externality
As transnational pollution crosses boundaries the country receiving the pollution cannot impose effluent taxes
on the other country to control the pollution.  In addition, there is no international institution to enforce a
Pigouvian tax to improve global welfare.  Thus, environmental economists consider trade policy a possible
approach to control transnational pollution.
Baumol and Oates (1989) present some theoretical analysis of tariffs as instruments to reduce transnational
pollution.  If one country exports goods that caused transnational pollution during the manufacture process, the
importing country can tax those imports to pay for the pollution damage.  Baumol and Oates conclude that, in
general, tariffs cannot reach a Pareto Optimum, which would be yielded by the internationally Pigouvian tax on
emissions.  Here, the international Pigouvian tax is defined as the total marginal damage over all the countries
that are victims of the externality.  In the presence of transnational pollution, zero tariff levels are not the best
solution for the country importing the pollution-related commodities.  If the social costs of transnational
pollution fall entirely on the importing country, this creates an international quasi-optimal tariff, lower than the
one by which the importing country could maximize its social welfare alone.  It is possible that the unilateral
tariff applied for environmental purposes is larger than the second best tariff.  The negative effect of such a
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policy is that it may result in trade friction.  Even so, Baumol and Oates argue that a pollution tariff could
threaten to force polluting countries to negotiate.
As mentioned in Baumol and Oates (1989), the international pigouvian tax (IPT) is the best policy to control
transnational pollution.  However there are many reasons why policymakers cannot effectively implement IPT.
According to conventional wisdom, the reluctance of polluting countries is the major obstacle to such a tax
because many presume that polluting countries would be worse off under that ruling.  Kohn (1991) challenges
this argument.  He tests the welfare effect of  IPT using the framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
model.  Contrary to traditional thinking, Kohn shows that polluting countries would benefit from an IPT,
however, countries that pollute less would suffer losses.  The intuitive explanation of the finding is
straightforward.  The IPT will increase the price of pollution-intensive goods, and the polluting country will
export the product. So, the polluting country would benefit from the IPT program but a less polluting country
would suffer from higher prices.  
With a simple graphical illustration, Snape (1989) suggests that the best policy for the victim of transnational
pollution is a consumption tax.  In his model, country A produces goods X, which generates pollution.  Country
B does not produce X and is the only consumer.  Snape discusses the effect of three different polices towards
the externalities associated with producing X in country A if all pollution falls in country B:
(1) country A levies a tax on its production,
(2) an international authority collects either a production tax or a consumption tax, and
(3) country B levies a tax on its consumption. 
The welfare of country B is worse under the first two policies compared with the no-regulation situation.  Only
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when country B collects a consumption tax will welfare improve.  In Snape's model, the consumption tax is the
same as the import tariff on goods X.
Using a simulation model to explore the effect of a tariff as an instrument for environmental control,  Low
(1992) finds interesting empirical evidence.  He assumes NAFTA will remove all tariffs on Mexican exports. 
Instead, the United States imposes Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure (PACE) tariffs on all
products from Mexico's polluting industries.  The PACE is equal to the marginal cost of U.S. levels of
environmental protection. Using these assumptions, he tests the effect of PACE on Mexican exports to United
States.  The results show that the impact is modest.  The quantity of Mexican exports to the United States
declines by no more than 2%.  This implies that the tariff does not change the behavior of dirty Mexican
industries.  Therefore, it is not effective in attaining environmental goals.  Low's simulation is an empirical
evaluation on using a general tariff for environmental purposes and not of an optimal tariff designed for
transnational pollution.  So, we can use it as an empirical reference for examining the effect of a tariff on
transnational pollution.
First, concerning efficiency, the tariff rate against transnational pollution cannot exceed the PACE because it is
equal to (or less than) the marginal damage of pollution by PACE's definition.  Second, the U.S. taxes all dirty
industries in Mexico.  This implies that industries responsible for transnational pollution are also objects of
PACE tariffs.  Therefore, Low's simulation infers that the tariff instrument for environment purpose is not as
effective as expected.
We must note that trade policy as an instrument to control transnational pollution has one limitation.  It needs
to be  based on the flow of commodities.  We must measure the tariff against transnational pollution by the
marginal damage of pollution.  Many empirical studies show that pollution abatement costs are a small
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proportion of production costs and may affect trade policy on transnational pollution only slightly.  Is it
possible to increase the tariff for environmental purposes?  Probably not, since it is not efficient to levy a tariff
higher than marginal damage from pollution.  Furthermore, the tariff itself contradicts the spirit of GATT,
promoting free trade.  In fact, industries may criticize a tariff for environmental purposes as a trade barrier.
In another study about transnational pollution and trade Merrifield (1988) uses a general equilibrium model to
analyze transnational pollution, particularly transnational pollution between the United States and Canada. 
Merrifield considers a trade system consisting of two countries, A and B.  Country A produces commodity X. 
Country B produces goods Y.  Inputs are capital and labor, which can move freely between the two countries. 
Producing X and Y will create pollution, which can flow from one country to the other.  The countries
implement pollution abatement standards using non-traded intermediate goods.  Assuming free mobility of
commodities, capital and labor between the countries, Merrifield concludes that only tight pollution abatement
standards can reduce transnational pollution.  The potential result of a unilateral tax policy is unclear.  It may
increase the volume of emissions. 
For example,  if the density of emissions per capita in industry X is higher than in industry Y of country B, and
country B levies a tax on production of X, then capital of industry Y will migrate to industry X in country A. 
The additional capital will generate more emissions than it did in industry Y.  So, the total emissions will
increase.  If both countries simultaneously impose a tax on production, the pollution deposited in the two
countries will be the same as before.  In Merrifield's models, the assumption that only two sectors exist in the
economy restricts resource reallocation.  To maintain the full use of resources, they have to be used either by
industries X and Y or by pollution abatement.
Rauscher (1993), in his recent study, specifies that a nation may reduce its environmental quality if it
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unilaterally imposes strict environmental regulation. Those theoretic evaluations imply that a unilateral
approach may be ineffective and counter-productive in an open economy with free capital mobility. 
B.  Transnational Pollution by Wastes Trade
Trade in hazardous and nonhazardous waste is a recent phenomenon.  Since 1986, Western Europe and North
America have exported more than three million tons of wastes.  At least 73 less industrialized countries are the
proposed dumpsites for wastes from industrialized countries (Greenpeace, 1989).  According a statement made
by the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) to the U.S. Congress (Hajost, 1989),  EPA received only 12
applications in 1980 to exports hazardous wastes.  However, applications rose to 588 in 1989.  Actually, there
is no regulation governing non-hazardous solid wastes exported from the United States.  Several years ago
there was a proposal to export 34 billion pounds of domestic municipal wastes over a five year period
(Greenpeace, 1989).
Historically, industrialized nations, such as the United States and Canada conducted trade in wastes among
themselves.  Now, less developed countries are becoming dumping sites for the garbage of developed
countries.  Klatte's (1980) data show that among 46 actual and proposed shipments of wastes, all the
destinations are developing countries except Canada, while all the exporters are industrialized countries.
There are two contradictory opinions about the regulation of the waste trade.  Most industrialized countries
prefer to free such trade.  On the other hand, the active environmental groups European Environment Entente
and Greenpeace want a ban on the trade.  In addition, some African countries criticized the waste trade as
"toxic terrorism."  So far, 45 developing countries have banned waste imports (Greenpeace, 1989).  At the
24
same time, the number of countries that may become potential markets for wastes is increasing.  For example,
the Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics are preparing to enter this market (Conyers, 1989).
 Recently, the United Nations Environment Program sponsored an international treaty in an attempt to control
hazardous waste trade.  It is called the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.  The treaty, however has had the opposite effect.  By persuading more
than 30 countries to sign the treaty, the United Nations has, in effect, legalized the trade in hazardous wastes.
The gain from trade is a strong motivation for both countries to engage in such garbage trade.  The increasing
cost of disposing of wastes has increased the pressure on manufacturers to find overseas sites for their wastes. 
It is cheaper and easier to dump the wastes in developing countries.  In the United States, the average cost of
disposing of hazardous waste was $15 per ton in 1980.  But it soared to $200 per ton in 1987 (Poter, 1986). 
For example, the cost of shipping wastes from Philadelphia to Africa for disposal was $20 per ton compared
with $50 per ton if the wastes are disposed of locally (Dufour and Denis, 1988). 
Increasing disposal costs is only one of the reasons producers are seeking to landfill abroad.  Stricter
environmental regulations in developed countries has caused assimilative capacity in industrialized countries to
become more and more scarce.  In the United States alone, with tighter regulations being introduced in 1984,
two-thirds of existing landfills are no longer able to accept hazardous wastes (Uva and Bloom, 1991). 
Increasing waste and insufficient  processing facilities also contribute to the trend of dumping waste in
developing countries.  The European Union generates about 30 to 40 million tons of hazardous  wastes per
year, but can process only 10 million tons (Uva and Bloom, 1991).
On the importing side, less developed countries receive foreign currency as payment for disposing of wastes. 
These countries, many of which are deeply in debt, desperately need the income from such trade.  In 1988,
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Guinea-Bissau signed a contract to accept 3.5 million tons of hazardous wastes for $140 million.  This amount
is greater than its gross national product (Dufour and Denis, 1988). 
In some deals, the importing countries' benefits lie beyond cash.  Bangladesh, Paraguay, Haiti, Angola,
Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Honduras, and some other countries use foreign hazardous wastes as fuel to generate
electricity.  Some exporting countries promise to construct an incinerator to burn the wastes and generate
power.  In effect, their trade in wastes transfers waste disposal technology from developed countries to
developing ones.  As a result, developing countries can improve the technology to control pollution in their
countries. 
Wastes, used as land reclamation material in a country where land is scarce or unusable, can be equally
attractive.  The President of the Marshall Islands has given the U.S. firm, Admiralty Pacific, preliminary
approval to import about one-third of California's  wastes.  The residents of the Marshall Islands want to use
the wastes to increase the size and elevation of the island (Greenpeace, 1989).  Some solid wastes are
recyclable.  For example, Mexico is one major country importing recyclable wastes from the United States.
This discussion emphasizes that both sides of these transactions, industrialized countries and less developed
countries, may be better off through free trade in wastes.  Industrialized countries dispose of their wastes at
lower costs.  Through trade, the developing countries are able to substitute the assimilative capacity (which has
low marginal utility) for hard currency or other commodities with high marginal utility in their social welfare
function.  Hence, trade enhances total social welfare.
It is easy to construct a model of international waste trade.  In the market, demand is from all countries
generating waste.  The countries with excessive assimilative capacity supply disposal facilities.  Efficient trade
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will be when demand and supply are equal.  The crucial question is how to determine the correct supply curve
that shows the full costs of disposing of imported wastes.  For this transaction, the supply not only depends on
excess assimilative capacity but also on waste content and its potential risk.  For example, under constant
excess assimilative capacity, the supply curve would differ concerning hazardous and non-hazardous wastes. 
Hence, an importer must get complete information about the wastes. 
For the sake of optimal trade, Oates and Schwab (1988) suggest four necessary conditions: 
(1) the exporting country should inform the receiving country about the content of the wastes and their
potential risks,
(2) the reservation price must include not only the opportunity cost of the land but also the full social cost
caused by the disposal of the waste,
(3) transportation costs must incorporate the full social cost of shipping the wastes from the generating site
to the destination, and
(4) developing countries must effectively enforce environmental regulations to reduce the illegal dumping
that creates substantial social costs. 
Obviously, the first requirement is for complete information, a necessity for optimal trade.  Complete
disclosure is essential before developing countries can implement the second and third conditions.
Without considering the morality of such actions, it is possible that the exporting country may release only
partial information on its wastes.  It is in the exporter's interest to withhold or distort such information.  More
information implies higher prices for disposal.  If complete information is not available, the importing country
cannot measure the disposal cost and associated social cost correctly.  Thus, waste trade conducted under such
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conditions is not desirable.
Besides the requirement for complete information, the difference between long- and short-run social cost
associated with the disposal of importing wastes would influence waste trade negotiations.  We can assume that
demand for high environmental quality will increase with increasing income.  Eventually, the income of
developing countries will rise.  The marginal disutility or marginal damage from storing foreign wastes will
increase. 
For example, marginal damage from nuclear wastes imported by a low-income country will be less now than in
ten years when the residents enjoy a higher standard of living.  This implies that the average long-run social
cost of importing wastes is higher than short-run costs.  Thus, if the importing country considers only short-run
social cost when negotiating waste trade, it will not achieve optimality.  Moreover, if the pollution generated by
an imported waste is persistent, developing countries should include the long-run social cost in the measure of
reservation price to yield optimal trade.
In the trade of goods the flow of commodities out of the country increases credit in trade accounts.  In the trade
of wastes, the flow of wastes increases debt in the trade balance account because the exporter pays the importer
for disposing of them.  The waste importer, on the other hand, gains credit by receiving the wastes.  Once the
importing country receives the wastes, it must dispose of the wastes in its landfill or incinerating facilities. 
This implies that the corresponding ownership of assimilative capacity was sold to another country though
there is no physical movement of assimilative capacity.  In other words, the trade of wastes is equal to the trade
of assimilative capacity.  In the former, the trade is described in term of bads.  In the latter, trade is represented
by goods.  When the trade of wastes is illustrated by the transfer of assimilative capacity, it is similar to trade in
any good.  So, assimilative capacity is not only a priced commodity, but also a traded commodity, as is labor,
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capital, or any other good. 
The pattern of waste trade includes two routes.  One route is from a high-income country to a low-income
country.  The other route is between industrialized countries.  This is where the wastes flows from a country
with  abundant assimilative capacity to one where assimilative capacity is scarce.
V.  Conflict Between Trade and Environmental Policy
The conflict between trade and environmental policy focuses on using either international trade instruments,
such as tariffs, to achieve environmental goals or unilateral environmental regulations.  Many criticize them as
non-tariff barriers.  Trade instruments belong to the subset of instruments that are based on flows of
commodities between nations.  They include import tariffs, export taxes, export and import sanctions, and
quotas.  GATT will reduce or end these instruments. 
Over the last decades, many governments and other organizations have implemented environmental treaties. 
Some rely on international trade restrictions for enforcement.  In 1989, the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora imposed a trade ban on products from endangered African
elephants.  To regulate hazardous wastes and prevent industrialized countries from dumping them in
developing countries, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal prohibits waste shipments to nonsignatories.  The recent "Montreal Protocol," restricts
substances that deplete the ozone layer.  This treaty also restricts the export and import of chlorofluorocarbon
(CFC) products.
Several other unilateral environmental regulations depend on trade instruments for enforcement.  Senate Bill
2887, proposed by U.S. Senator Lautenberg, prohibits granting special trade status to countries that do not
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meet U.S. pollution and abatement standards under the Caribbean Basin Initiative or the Generalized System of
Preferences.  A well-known example of unilateral action using trade instruments is the U.S embargo on
Mexican tuna and tuna products.  The U.S. Marine Protection Act (MPA) was invoked because Mexican
fishers were using a method to harvest tuna that killed dolphin at a rate exceeding the standard permitted by
MPA (Housman and Zaelke, 1992).  These trade restrictions lead some observers to predict a growing trend
toward using trade measures to reach environmental goals (Whalley, 1991).
In addition to trade instruments, other measures restrict the free movement of commodities.  Some are domestic
measures to protect health, safety, or the environment.  Some supporters of free trade view these domestic
environmental regulations as non-tariff barriers.  The German packaging recycling law (Anonymous, 1991)
stunned the European Union's packaging industry.  This law insists that purchasers my dispose of only 28% of
the containers of imported beer and soft drinks containers locally.  The remainder must be returned to the
producers.  Obviously, the law favors domestic manufacturers. 
In 1989, the Unites States adopted requirements for increasing the content of recycled paper in newsprint to
support its recycling market and reduce solid waste.  To Canadian pulp and paper companies, however, these
recycling requirements are non-tariff barriers because used newspaper collection and de-inking facilities are
more costly in Canada (Knight, 1991).  Perhaps the best-known example of environmental regulation as a non-
tariff barrier is the case of the Commission of the European Communities versus Kingdom of Denmark. 
Denmark mandated that beverages be sold only in returnable containers.  Beverage importers objected to this
rule as an import barrier because of the high costs of collecting the containers.  The European Court decided
for the beverage importers, ruling that measures to protect the environment should be those that least restrict
the free movement of goods (McSlarrow, 1991).
There are supporters and detractors of using trade instruments for environmental purposes.  Opponents claim
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the measures are inefficient in controlling pollution, hinder free trade, and harm international cooperation in
reducing trade barriers.  Low and Safadi (1992) say that the only time trade instruments are the best choice for
reaching environmental goals is when they are used to enforce international treaties. 
After reviewing trade measures that may be employed for environmental problems, Subramanian (1992)
concludes that most of the environmental problems have no root in international trade.  Rather, they result from
market failure and should relate closely to the externality.   Subramanian suggests that, instead of trade
measures, the best choice for resolving environmental problems is intervention at the level of consumption or
production, or developing a suitable property right.  He also says a disparity in environmental policies is only
one of the factors yielding to comparative advantage.  Differences in the environmental endowment, pollution
assimilative capacity, and the social valuation of the environment are also factors influencing comparative
advantage.  So, to apply trade instruments for restoring comparative advantage is inappropriate.  Also, since
trade instruments are protectionist in intent, they might be used as a to prohibit or limit imports.  Subramanian
includes the possibility that a trade threat could be an effective means of avoiding free riders on international
environmental treaties.
Frequently, governments unilaterally impose trade instruments for environmental objectives.  A country with
strict environmental policy may try to impose its environmental standards on other countries through trade
sanctions or threats.  Sorsa (1989) maintains that governments should not impose unilateral sanctions for
several reasons.  He argues that the existence and extent of many international environmental problems are
difficult to measure and subject to value judgments and scientific uncertainties.  It is also  difficult to identify
the sources of pollution and underlying causal relationships, thus applying unilateral trade sanctions is
questionable. 
Another objection is that only large countries can make such sanctions effective.  This fact may lead them to
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impose their own values and standards on small countries.  In addition, developing countries are likely to
become targets of unilateral sanctions because their technological and financial conditions lag developed
countries.  Sorsa argues that unilateral sanctions will reduce developing countries' gains, desperately needed for
economic and environmental protection.  Sorsa concludes, therefore, that unilateral sanctions are counter-
productive.
Authors who favor trade instruments for achieving environmental goals consider them effective ways to deal
with global environmental problems, transnational pollution, and competitive disadvantage caused by strict
environmental regulation.  Whalley (1991) argues that a moral commitment to an international environmental
treaty will not guarantee the fulfillment of environmental goals for global environmental problems, such as
global warming and ozone layer depletion.  Similarly, Whalley says the assumption that governments will
flawlessly enforce international environmental treaties is also narrow minded. 
Because global environmental problems largely involve public goods, free riders may undermine efforts to
control global environmental degradation, particularly if governments do not implement punishment and
enforcement mechanisms.  Therefore, Whally says that trade instruments, such as trade barriers or retaliation,
may help to enforce environmental treaties.  Governments often apply trade instruments to transnational
pollution to defend the home environment because domestic environmental laws do not regulate foreign
countries.  Even as pollution spills over the border, polluters usually have incentives to regulate pollution-
intensive industries.  Governments can reduce transnational pollution by levying tariffs to decrease demand for
the pollution-related goods.  They can use revenue from tariffs to abate pollution.  In fact, the United States has
imposed border charges on some imported commodities derived from chemical materials.  The GATT permits
this border tax.
Another motivation for using trade instruments for environmental goals is to reduce the disadvantage resulting
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from strict environmental regulations.  Shrybman (1990) argues that permitting polluters to exploit public
resources, such as air and water, is the most common form of "environmental subsidy."  If a country tries to
maintain its high environmental standard and avoid degeneration of its industrial competitiveness in the
international market, its choices are to levy an import tariff on pollution-intensive goods or to subsidize its own
pollution-intensive industry.
It is not easy to find a solution to reconcile the dispute between these two sides.  So far, GATT panels judge
most of the collisions between trade and environmental policy.  The overall goal of GATT is to provide
contracting countries with standardized principles for international trade and to promote free trade among
them.  There are some exceptions in the GATT, which permits the application of trade barriers to protect
human, animal, and plant life.  But environmentalists think the GATT overlooks the environmental dimension
of international trade (Shrybman, 1990). 
Questions remain about what rules to follow when the environment and trade collide.  As noted from the
earlier discussions, some attack the use of trade instruments for environmental purposes for its alleged
inefficiency.  However, the conditions that assure an efficient policy hardly exist outside of theory.  In
actuality, the existence of free riders has broken the initial conditions for an efficient solution.  In addition,
irresponsible polluters cause trade instruments to be applied.  Thus, the second or the third best choice is the
only workable choice. 
As conflict between trade and the environment occurs, it is inappropriate to ignore either of the two sides. 
Since gains or losses in environmental quality are difficult to measure, we may underestimate the value of the
environment if we use traditional efficiency measures to justify environmental policy.  We might need to
redefine efficiency and consider both environmental and trade goals.  When considering the conflict between
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domestic environmental policy and free trade we must avoid double standards.  It is incorrect for a country
with high environmental standards to impose its values on other countries.  It is also inappropriate to label a
country's strict environmental regulation as non-tariff barriers if their domestic environmental policy does not
discriminate against imported goods.  If we insist that we tolerate environmental pollution because of social
judgment and respect for a nation's sovereignty, we can not force developing countries to accept developed
countries' standards for environment protection.  Neither should we demand that a country loosen its strict
environment regulations in the name of free trade.
VI.  Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade
The Studies outlined in previous sections concentrate on the distortion caused by environmental policy on
international trade. In those discussions, environmental policy is an external variable to competitiveness, terms
of trade, or the relocation of polluting industries.  International trade, except the trade of hazardous wastes, is
not the target of environmental policy.  Most consider the variation of environmental standards across nations
to be a result of different social preferences, economic development, and different endowments of nature
resources.  However, in recent studies, some authors have argued that by removing conventional trade
measures such as import tariffs and export subsidies, environmental policy could become an integral part of
trade policy and used to promote export of pollution-intensive goods. The term "strategic environmental policy
"  refers to environmental policy that is oriented toward promoting exports rather than abating pollution.
The starting point of the theoretical discussion is a world of imperfect or oligopolistic competition. In that
world, the number of polluting firms is small and there exists super-normal returns or rents to scarce resources.
To protect its polluting industries and shift the rent from its foreign rival, a nation has a strategic incentive to
deviate from traditional optimal environmental policy (Pigouvian tax). This strategic behavior will be welfare
enhancing.  The environment is the victim of strategic behavior.  And, the gains from trade occur because of
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deteriorating environmental quality. Environmentalists describe the phenomenon as " ecological dumping".
Most researchers use the Brander and Spencer (1985) model as the basis for their theoretical studies on
strategic environmental policy and trade.  In those studies they justify government intervention by way of
export subsidies.  Within an oligopolistic model, Barrett (1994) provides a comprehensive insight on strategic
environmental policy.  In his model, there are few nations.  Each nation has only one producer.  Producers
determine their output through Cournot competition in the world market.  The researchers excluded what these
countries consume from the analysis. Governments use emission standards to control the externality associated
with their domestic productions.  The internal emission standard, used to maximize a nation's welfare, is
defined as the rent earned in the world market less the disutility generated by pollution.  Barrett proves that if a
nation tries to maximize its international welfare, it will set emission standards too high.  That is, the marginal
cost of pollution abatement will be less than marginal damage resulting in too much pollution.  The author
predicts that, in a world of imperfect competition, a nation may strategically distort its environmental policy to
support its industry in international competition.
Conrad (1993) finds similar results using an emission tax.  He based his discussion on the Brander and Spencer
duopoly model. Conrad shows that a country's emission tax associates negatively with domestic profit but
associates positively with its foreign rivals.  If a government acts strategically the "optimal emission tax" is less
than marginal damage.  In addition, Conrad suggests using an abatement subsidy to promote export from
polluting industries. He claims that, by granting a subsidy to heavily taxed polluting industries, a country will
improve its welfare by capturing more market share.  The distortion of the emission tax from the optimal
Pigouvian tax is less than the distortion that occurs when a government does not implement a subsidy program.
 Conrad suggests that the subsidy is the better choice for strategic intervention.  This is because it not only
promotes export but improves the efficiency of resources allocation by high emission tax.
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As a choice of strategic environmental policy, emission standards and emission taxes may generate different
results.  Ulph (1993) showed this crucial difference.  In that work, Ulph uses a simple model to show an
optimally distorted emission tax will stimulate more exports than will a distorted emissions standard.  Ulph
incorporates the strategic behavior of producers (in addition to countries) in his analysis.  He assumes that
producers invest in research and development (R&D) as a strategic response to environmental regulation. 
Ulph concludes that if only producers act strategically, there will be excessive over-investments in R&D.  That
is, the marginal revenue from the investments will be less than the marginal costs.  If both governments and
producers act strategically, they will lessen the incentives for governments to change environmental policy.  So,
the difference of the actual emissions tax from the Pigouvian tax becomes smaller when only the government
acts strategically.
The studies mentioned above provide a theoretical foundation for analyzing ecological dumping and looking at
intervention.  However, the arguments may not be strong.  First, the argument for strategic environmental
policy rests on the above-normal return of the particular polluting industry. The return cannot be persistent.  As
more capital flows into the industry, the above-normal return will disappear.  Second, that industry is
generating public bads.  If a government chose strategic environmental policy, there would inevitably be
change in how efficiently the resources are allocated.  As the industry absorbs more capital, the country will
specialize in the polluting industry and will experience rapidly increasing pollution.  Finally, the effectiveness
of strategic environmental policy on export promotion depends on how costly the industry finds environmental
regulation.  The effect would be minimal if the costs are low.  
VII.  Conclusions
Trade and the environment is not only a high profile policy issue today but is proving to be a fertile subject for
academic research. We have identified five areas of debate and research:
36
• the distortion of comparative advantage due to environmental regulation,
• the impact of environmental regulation on the location of polluting industry,
• transnational pollution and trade in wastes,
• the potential conflict between trade policy and environmental policy, and
• the use of environmental regulations as strategic trade instruments.
These studies not only improve our understanding about the interaction between trade and the environment but
also have substantial policy implications.  First, in an open economy, environmental policy is one factor
determining trade patterns and capital movements.  The theoretical literature consistently illustrates this point. 
Thus, we cannot ignore trade impact when formulating environmental policy.  To reduce the potential adverse
effect, market-based instruments should have priority over command and control approaches. 
Second, besides differences in the strictness of environmental policy, differences in assimilative capacity,
social preferences about environmental goods, and property rights also can be sources of comparative
advantage for polluting industries.  This implies that the standardizing environmental policy across national
boundaries will not reduce the negative impact on the competitiveness of industries regulated by high
environmental standards. 
Third, there exists no convincing evidence from the empirical literature to support many hypotheses about the
interaction between trade and the environment.  This shows that other factors dominate environmental policy in
influencing trade and capital movements.  The empirical literature also suggests that trade patterns and capital
flows are composite results of a variety of factors.  And, governments should frame the assessment of the trade
impact on environmental regulation in a system which includes all important factors. 
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Fourth, concerning transnational pollution or global environmental problems, governments should avoid
applying trade instruments to control pollution.  Fundamentally, trade instruments, such as tariffs or sanctions,
are noncooperative polices and may cause new distortions on trade and confrontation between countries. 
However, if governments use trade policy to promote the export of pollution abatement and control technology,
it may produce positive results. 
Finally, evaluating environmental policies without considering the welfare improvements from a cleaner
environment biases the results.  Trade and environmental policies are designed to serve different economic and
social goals.  It is unreasonable to justify either of them simply through their side effects.  Policymakers should
base their cost-effective analysis of environmental policy on the overall welfare change rather than the gains or
losses of a single industry.
Two areas of further research warrant further investigation. One concerns how policymakers should modify the
standard HOV model to account for environmental quality. Certainly a country's assimilative capacity is a
resource that should influence comparative advantage.  However, the demand for environmental quality is
internal, dependent on income and assimilative capacity. A second issue is empirical. Governments face a
continuing challenge to measure the effect of differential preferences/regulations and trade in pollution-
intensive goods. The empirical literature to date has been unclear.
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